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Abstract 
Drunken sex is common. Despite how common drunken sex is, we think very uncritically about it. In this 
paper, I want to examine whether drunk individuals can consent to sex. Specifically, I answer this 
question: suppose that an individual, D, who is drunk but can still engage in reasoning and 
communication, agrees to have sex with a sober individual, S; is D’s consent to sex with S morally valid? 
I will argue that, within a certain range of intoxication, an individual who is drunk can give valid consent 
to have sex with an individual who is sober. 
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Sober Thoughts on Drunken Consent: Intoxication and Consent to Sexual Relations 
Drunken sex is common. Humans like to drink alcohol, they like to have sex, and alcohol often makes sex 
more likely. Despite how common drunken sex is, we think very uncritically about it. In this paper, I want 
to examine one aspect of the morality of drunken sex, namely whether drunk individuals can consent to 
have sex. In recent years, there has been considerable debate and controversy in both the popular media 
and the scholarly community about whether intoxicated individuals can give morally valid consent to 
have sexual relations. Although no laws have been passed to criminalize intoxicated sex, numerous 
universities have adopted strict policies that ban any kind of intoxicated sex. I hope to shed light on the 
issue of intoxicated consent. Specifically, I answer the following question: suppose that an individual, D, 
who is drunk to a substantial degree but can still engage in reasoning and communication, agrees to have 
sex with a sober individual, S; is D’s consent to sex with S morally valid? I will argue that, within a 
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certain range of intoxication, an individual who is drunk can give valid consent to have sex with an 
individual who is sober. 
In broad strokes, my argument for this conclusion comes in two parts. First, I argue that there is 
no compelling reason to think that D cannot give valid consent to have sex with S. But, this may not be 
enough. D may be capable of giving valid consent, and it could still be true that S should not act on D’s 
consent, even if it in fact is valid. In the second part of my argument, I argue that S can permissibly act on 
D’s consent.  
In section I, I clarify the question that I am asking. In section II, I describe the relevant 
background and literature. In section III, I outline stipulations. In section IV, I outline what I take to be an 
exhaustive list of reasons one might give to support the view that drunk people cannot give valid consent 
to have sex, and I argue that each of them fails. In section V, I outline and reject reasons one might give 
for thinking that S should not act on D’s consent even if it is valid.  In section VI, I address whether the 
stipulations from section III can be relaxed while still allowing my argument to succeed. Lastly, in section 
VII I address the implications that my argument has for university policy.  
Before proceeding, I will note what I am not arguing. I will argue that an individual who is 
intoxicated can give valid consent to have sex with a sober individual, even if they are strangers. This is 
controversial. For that reason, I’d like to explicitly state that my position does not entail that date rape is 
permissible, nor is it denying that women are frequently abused due to alcohol on college campuses. I 
reject these views. As will become clear, drugging and raping someone violates many of the stipulations 
that will govern the cases I discuss. I am concerned only with cases in which the drunken individual 
genuinely wants to have sex. I defend the view that such an individual can validly consent. This is 
compatible with the extreme wrongness of sexual assault and rape that occur to women who are 
intoxicated and who do not want to engage in sexual relations. 
I. The Question: 
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It is obvious that very low levels of intoxication (i.e. one drink) do not undermine an individual’s ability 
to give valid consent, and it is obvious that extreme levels of intoxication (i.e. when a person has 
consumed enough alcohol to be non-communicative) do undermine her ability to give valid consent. This 
is the case, because a low level of intoxication does not undermine an agent’s control over her actions, 
and an extreme level of intoxication does undermine an agent’s control over her actions.1 The debate 
about intoxicated consent concerns cases between these two extremes.2 I refer to this area as the ‘gray 
area.’ Essentially, the debate about intoxicated consent concerns cases in which D, who is intoxicated at 
some level in the gray area, says ‘yes’ to having sex with S, who is sober. If a drunk person asks a sober 
person to have sex with her, can the sober person act on this token of consent and have sex with the drunk 
person? Or, as Wertheimer puts it, does “yes means yes” when one party is intoxicated?3  
It is important to distinguish this question from several different but related questions. Although it 
will come up briefly in one section, I will not be asking whether drunkenness is a legal or moral excuse 
for criminal behavior.4 That is an important but different question. I am asking whether an individual’s 
ability to consent is undermined by intoxication, not whether intoxication renders one off the hook for 
immoral actions. Another set of questions I won’t address directly concerns whether having intoxicated 
sex is incompatible with virtue or whether it is scummy to engage in drunken sex. Although these are 
certainly important questions, I’m concerned with the permissibility of intoxicated consent, not with these 
virtue-based questions. Lastly, I will not address the question of whether universities should adopt 
affirmative consent policies. My view is neutral with regard to the debate about affirmative consent 
policies. It could be the case that drunk individuals are not competent to consent, in which case their 
 
1 It may also be true that extreme intoxication undermines consent for a reason other than removing control. 
2 Dixon (2001, 341) describes the question and the gray area in a very similar way. 
3 Werthiemer, 2001, 373. 
4 There is an extensive literature on this topic. Much of this literature either addresses legal questions about 
punishment and intoxication, or it addresses the question of blame and intoxication broadly. Both of these 
approaches are distinct from the issue of intoxicated consent to sex. For a discussion of these other issues, see 
Dimock (2009, 2011) Husak (2012), Cowan (2008), and Cole 2017). 
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affirmative ‘yes’ is not morally transformative, and it could be the case that drunk individuals are 
competent to consent but can communicate this consent without using language.5  
II. Background and Literature So Far: 
Despite the importance of this topic, there is relatively little written in the philosophical literature on the 
moral status of drunken sex. In the sparse literature, Dixon and McGregor have endorsed the view that 
drunk sex is not permissible. Hurd has defended the view that drunken sex is permissible.6 Beyond these 
very few articles, philosophers have not discussed the connection between alcohol and consent. I hope to 
fill this gap in the literature. 
Practically speaking, the law does not address the question of drunken sex directly. The law does 
recognize a crime called rape by intoxication, but this crime requires the victim to be extremely 
intoxicated beyond the gray area and often requires that the victim’s intoxication is involuntary, meaning 
that this law is not relevant to the kind of drunken sex that I want to analyze.7 The law appears to have 
little directly to say on the questions addressed in this paper. 
 
5 For a recent discussion of affirmative consent policies, see Dougherty (2018). 
6 Wertheimer wrote an excellent exploratory piece on the issue of drunk sex, but he finishes without reaching a 
definitive conclusion on its permissibility. I should add that McGregor’s endorsement of this view comes only in a 
short aside in an examination of a related issue.  
7 Ryan describes the conditions of rape-by-intoxication as the following: “If a woman is ‘mentally incapacitated’ or 
‘rendered incapable of effectually resisting’ due to intoxication, then the man who engaged in sexual activity with 
the woman may be guilty of rape. Under these circumstances, the intoxicated woman is considered incapable of 
giving legal consent to intercourse because her ability to exercise reasonable judgment is impaired. Almost every 
state has adopted legislation that in some way prohibits the use of alcohol to facilitate unlawful sexual intercourse. 
Rape that occurs when the victim is intoxicated can be divided into two offenses: (1) administration of alcohol to the 
victim, causing her incapacity, followed by nonconsensual sex; and (2) voluntary intoxication of the victim, which 
causes her incapacity, followed by nonconsensual sex. Approximately two-thirds of states require that a perpetrator, 
who engages in sexual intercourse with an intoxicated victim, administer the intoxicating substance to the victim 
before assigning criminal liability for rape, which means that only one-third of the states afford protection to victims 
who voluntarily become intoxicated and are subsequently raped. In other words, the majority of states assign the risk 
of rape to the woman when she is voluntarily intoxicated. Because the majority of states hold that nonconsensual 
sexual intercourse with a voluntarily intoxicated woman does not constitute rape, she is responsible for remaining 
sober during sexual encounters. Only a minority of the states assign the risk of committing rape to the man when he 
engages in nonconsensual sex with a voluntarily intoxicated woman” (414). 
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Although the law has not addressed sex in the gray area, universities have begun to widely adopt 
policies on the issue. Many universities have passed policies that prohibit any amount of sex while 
intoxicated. Here are a few representative examples: 
Beloit College: Consenting to sexual activity requires non-intoxicated, verbal, mutually 
understood communication, free of threats, intimidation or other coercion…Having sex with 
someone you know to be, or whom you should know to be, below their normal cognitive function 
is a violation of the Beloit College Sexual Assault policy; sexual contact with anyone who is 
inebriated, mentally or physically impaired, or incapacitated is a violation of this policy.8 
University of Tulsa: When drugs and alcohol are involved, clear consent cannot be obtained. An 
intoxicated person cannot give consent.9 
Ohio University: Drugs and alcohol can affect a person’s ability to make decisions, including 
whether or not they want to engage in sexual activities. This means that if someone is intoxicated, 
they cannot give consent.10 
Given the lack of philosophical literature, the lack of legislation, and the strong actions being taken by 
universities, it is more important than ever to discuss whether drunken sex can be consensual sex. 
III. Stipulations: 
To cut out some clutter, I will make a number of stipulations. In case these stipulations strike the reader as 
over-idealized, I later discuss which stipulations can be relaxed without my argument failing.  
First, S and D are adults. Second, S and D have no history of sexual relationship and are 
acquaintances or strangers. Third, D is drunk. Fourth, D’s drunkenness falls into the gray area. To be 
more specific, the gray area refers to the amount of intoxication where one is clearly impaired but where 
one can still engage in basic reasoning and can communicate one’s desires. Fifth, S is sober or intoxicated 
at some level below the gray area. Sixth, D’s drunkenness is voluntary, meaning that she knowingly and 
willingly consumed the alcohol. Seventh, S is aware that D is intoxicated. Eighth, S consents to have sex 
 
8 Beloit College, n.p. 
9 The University of Tulsa, n.p.  
10 Ohio University, n.p. Emphasis original. 
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with D. Ninth, D either asks S to have sex or agrees when asked if she would like to. Tenth, no other 
consent invalidating features (i.e. coercion, deception, etc.) obtain in this situation. 
Finally, one terminological note: there is a difference between consent and valid consent. Both 
involve agreement, but valid consent is the kind of consent that makes an action permissible when it 
otherwise wouldn’t have been. In this paper, whenever I discuss consent, it should be assumed that I am 
discussing valid consent, unless I explicitly distinguish between consent and valid consent at a given 
point 
IV. Reasons Why D Might Not Be Able to Give Valid Consent: 
In this section, I’ll outline what I take to be an exhaustive list of the reasons one might give to explain 
why intoxication renders D’s consent invalid. Specifically, these are features of D’s intoxicated situation 
that might render her unable to give a valid ‘yes’ to sex. My aim will be to show that none of these are 
sufficient conditions for undermining D’s consent to sex. 
One might think that there is a better methodology for answering the question of whether 
intoxication in the gray area undermines one’s consent; this superior methodology is the following: if we 
agree that extreme intoxication does undermine consent, then we should find out what it is about extreme 
intoxication that undermines consent and then determine if this consent-undermining feature obtains in 
the case of gray area intoxication. This seems like a more direct way of answering the question rather than 
canvassing a number of possible reasons against the validity of drunken consent in the gray area. I believe 
that the methodology used in this paper is better for several reasons. First, I would like my view to be as 
pluralistic as possible. Were I to identify a single factor of extreme intoxication that undermines consent, 
this would require making a more substantive determination about the matter than I would like. Under my 
methodology, I am able to canvass all of the conceivable views for why gray area intoxication 
undermines consent and argue against them. Were I to pick just one reason why extreme intoxication 
undermines consent and then apply it to gray area intoxication, my argument would have less appeal to 
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potential interlocutors who are not swayed by that one reason. Second, I think that this alternative 
methodology would produce a very similar paper to the one I’ve written here. Suppose that I were to 
argue that extreme intoxication undermines consent, because it makes the agent’s behavior extremely 
irrational. Then, on this new methodology, I would apply this back to gray area consent and argue that 
gray area intoxication doesn’t render agents sufficiently irrational to undermine their consent. At this 
point, the objector would very likely say, “but what about other potential reasons to think that gray area 
consent is invalid?” Then, I would have to rule out those other options. And, that would duplicate much 
of the paper as I have set it up currently. The reason for this is that, on this method, I would only have 
determined that extreme irrationality is sufficient to undermine consent; I would still have to rule out 
other possible sufficient conditions for why extreme intoxication undermines consent. 
1: Alcohol Undermines Consent, Because It Impairs D’s Reasoning:11 
The thought here is that being intoxicated impairs one’s reasoning to the point of rendering this person 
unable to consent to having sex. When drunk, D simply cannot engage in the requisite reasoning in order 
to make the consensual decision to have sex. This seems like the most likely candidate for something that 
would invalidate intoxicated consent. So, even if D says ‘yes’ and wants to have sex, she lacks sufficient 
reasoning ability to really make this decision. 
Several objections can be raised to this line of reasoning. First, there are other stimuli that cause 
us to be bad at reasoning but which, intuitively, do not undermine consent; alcohol, I argue, should be 
treated no differently than these other stimuli. I focus specifically on the influence that run of the mill 
emotions have on decision making. Social psychology and behavioral economics have forcefully shown 
that our emotions strongly impact our decisions. This influence is not unlike the influence that alcohol has 
on our decision-making abilities.  
 
11 Whenever I say, “alcohol undermines consent, because it….,” I mean this to be shorthand for “alcohol always 
undermines consent, because…” 
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Our emotions, much like alcohol, affect our ability to make appraisals of risk, probability, and 
future emotions. As Loewenstein and Lerner note in a widely cited literature review: 
A well-replicated finding is that people in good moods make optimistic judgments and choices 
and people in bad moods make pessimistic judgments…people who read happy newspaper 
articles subsequently made more optimistic judgments about risk than people who read sad 
articles.12  
Immediate emotions influence people’s perceptions not only of the likelihood of different 
outcomes but also of how they will feel about those outcomes.13 
And, as Lerner et al. point out in another highly cited literature review: 
Fearful people tend to see greater risk, and angry people tend to see less risk.14 
Similar to alcohol, our emotions, via what psychologists refer to incidental affect, have downstream 
effects on our rationality. Loewenstein and Lerner note that “affect that is unrelated to the decision at 
hand-can have a significant impact on judgment and choice.”15 Or, as Lerner et al. put it, “researchers 
have found that incidental emotions pervasively carry over from one situation to the next, affecting 
decisions that should, from a normative perspective, be unrelated to that emotion.”16 Perhaps most 
notably, “carryover of incidental emotions typically occurs without awareness.”17  
Lastly, like alcohol, whatever emotions we are experiencing at the time of decision heavily 
influence us. This is particularly vivid in the following example: 
An experiment conducted in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks tested whether these patterns 
would scale up to the population level. A nationally representative sample of US citizens read 
either a real news story (on the threat of anthrax) selected to elicit fear or a real news story (on 
celebrations of the attacks by some people in Arab countries) selected to elicit anger, and then 
participants were asked a series of questions about perceived risks and policy 
preferences…Participants induced with fear perceived greater risk in the world, whereas those 
induced with anger perceived lower risk, for events both related and unrelated to terrorism. 
Participants in the anger condition also supported harsher policies against suspected terrorists 
than did participants in the fear condition.18 
 
12 Loewenstein and Lerner 628. 
13 Loewenstein and Lerner 628. 
14 Lerner et al. 807. 
15 Loewenstein and Lerner 619. 
16 Lerner et al. 803. 
17 Lerner et al. 803. 
18 Lerner et al. 807. 
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There are many more ways in which emotions bias us. I choose these few ways, because they track many 
of the features of intoxication that might render D too irrational to consent. Emotions, much like alcohol, 
make us bad at assessing the risks and rewards of our situation, bad at assessing if we will be happy with 
our decisions, they make us subject to our past feelings, and make us heavily swayed by whatever feeling 
is on our minds at the moment of decision. 
The point that I’m making is that despite the irrational influence of our emotions, it seems clear 
that we can still consent when our emotions affect us. The same should be true of alcohol. Overall, when I 
am angry, my reasoning is highly impaired, but I can still consent. When I am hungry, my reasoning is 
impaired, but I can still consent, etc. To put the point differently, if alcohol undermines consent because it 
impairs our reasoning, then our emotions also undermine our consent. This is implausible. So, it can’t be 
just the fact of some significant impairment to our reasoning abilities that explains why alcohol 
undermines consent. 
Second, depending on where we set the standard of reasoning ability required for consent, drunk 
people may meet it. Surely, there is some level of impairment caused by alcohol that does render consent 
invalid. Where is that line drawn? I suggest that it is sufficient for D to consent if D understands what she 
is consenting to, can understand the potential consequences of what she is consenting to, and if no other 
consent invalidating features are true of her situation. This standard seems plausible in general; if an adult 
of normal cognitive ability understands what she is agreeing to, and if she can understand the potential 
consequences, she should be able to consent to the action in question, barring some extreme negative 
consequence that might justify paternalism toward her. This seems to be the standard that we intuitively 
apply to normal judgements about consent. For example, we might think that a Jehovah’s Witness is 
making a terrible decision by not accepting a life-saving blood transfusion, but so long as she understands 
what she is doing and what the potential consequences are, then she should be able to do it. Returning to 
alcohol, given that D’s drunkenness is in the gray area, it is not so severe that she cannot understand what 
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she is doing or its likely consequences. So long as D can do both of these things, then she is sufficiently 
rational to meet the standards of valid consent. 
Third, Hurd argues that consent given in the gray area of intoxication is valid. Her argument runs 
as follows: first, she argues that voluntary intoxication does not release D from criminal liability. As she 
argues, if D were to voluntarily become intoxicated and cause a large amount of damage to S’s property, 
D’s intoxication would not release her from the obligation to pay damages to S. Then, Hurd argues that 
because of this, D’s voluntary intoxication should not invalidate her consent. As she says: 
If…our refusal to recognize voluntary intoxication as an excuse [for criminal liability] rests on 
the conviction that such intoxication never (or rarely) defeats a defendant’s ability to reason about 
his obligations and to act in accordance with those obligations, then we should not recognize 
voluntary intoxication as a condition that defeats prima facie consent because such intoxication 
presumably does not render the plaintiff any more incapable of guiding his actions in accordance 
with reason.19 
In short, the best reason we have for holding D responsible for criminal damages she causes while drunk 
is that she can still reason about what she is doing and can still be responsible for his decisions. Hurd then 
argues that this extends to intoxicated consent to sex; D can still reason about his decisions and can still 
be held responsible for them. Thus, D can give consent to sex while intoxicated. Or, as Wertheimer 
summarizes Hurd’s reasoning, “if people should be held responsible for wrongful acts committed while 
intoxicated (including acts of violence against women), then we should also treat [D’s]…consent as 
valid.”20   
Hurd’s argument can be made more plausible by appealing to a more intuitive case. Suppose that 
D is married, gets drunk at a bar, and has sex with S (who is not her spouse). Again, D’s drunkenness is in 
the gray area, and no other consent-invalidating features obtain. It seems clear that D has done something 
wrong and that she owes an apology to her spouse. This intuition only makes sense if D, while drunk, can 
be held responsible for her behavior. If D can be held responsible when she’s drunk, then this entails that 
 
19 Hurd, 141. 
20 Wertheimer, 2001, 374-375. It should be noted that Wertheimer is critical of Hurd’s position. 
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she has the cognitive wherewithal to validly consent to the thing that she’s being held responsible for. 
After all, it would be odd to say that D is responsible for an action but that she could not validly consent 
to that action. 
Hurd’s argument will strike many as wildly controversial and close to victim-blaming. This is not 
the case. Hurd is not saying that because a woman is drunk, this therefore exonerates a man who has sex 
with her when she is incompetent. Rather, a charitable interpretation of Hurd’s argument is that she is 
discussing a level of intoxication that falls into the gray area. If so, then Hurd is only claiming that an 
individual who is drunk but who can still understand the consequences of her decisions ought to be held 
responsible for any damages they cause and that this entails that a similarly drunk individual should be 
regarded as able to give valid consent. So understood, I don’t find Hurd’s argument implausible.  
Based on these three reasons, I conclude that the impairment to our reasoning caused by alcohol 
cannot be why alcohol invalidates consent.  
2: alcohol undermines consent, because it causes weakness of will: 
At a very basic level, weakness of will is when an agent doesn’t want to do something but does it anyway. 
For example, I know that an extra cookie is bad for me, and I don’t want to have one. But, when faced 
with a plate of cookies at a reception after a talk, I cave and eat one. This is a case of weak-willed action. 
I did not do what I ultimately wanted. One might think that something like this is going on in the case of 
intoxication. Alcohol might have an effect similar to weakness of will, in that it makes a person do 
something against her all-things-considered desires due to the influence of some kind of emotion or 
passion.  
The problem with this view is that weakness of will obviously does not undermine consent. My 
consent is valid when I eat the second cookie. Even though I don’t want to do it, it’s still consensual. 
There’s not much I can say here except that if weakness of will is sufficient to undermine one’s consent, 
then extra-marital affairs are not blameworthy (because the cheater couldn’t control himself), people who 
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spend too much while shopping have been taken advantage of by shop owners, and people who break 
their diets are not acting consensually. In short, this criterion has absurd implications. Unless weakness of 
will truly strips all agency from an individual, which no plausible account of weakness of will holds, then 
it does not undermine consent. 
3: alcohol undermines consent, because it causes D to act against one of her sober desires: 
Suppose that, when sober, D would not have wanted to have sex with S. But, when drunk, D does want to 
have sex with S. Alcohol causes D to act in such a way that she would not have acted if she were sober. 
Perhaps this is why D’s intoxicated consent is not valid consent.  
But, there are clear cases of consensual action that fit this description. This response 
overgeneralizes and proves too much. Consider the following cases: 
Run: going on a run can give us endorphins, which can cause us to be more happy and thus more 
likely to agree to things than we otherwise would have been. Suppose that S would not agree to 
sell his car to J without a boost of endorphins, but after S’s run, he feels so elated that he changes 
his mind and sells J the car.  
It seems absurd to say that S’s consent was violated in this transaction. 
Depression: S has depression and feels too sad and weary to consent to having sex with his 
partner. S takes an anti-depressant and decides that he wants to have sex with his partner. It seems 
absurd to say that we cannot count S’s consent as valid while he is on anti-depressants, even 
though he antecedently did not want to do this. 
The moral of the story is that there are clear cases in which, because of the influence of a chemical agent, 
an individual does something that she otherwise would not have done but in which her actions are 
obviously consensual. So, this can’t be the reason that alcohol invalidates consent. 
4: alcohol undermines consent, because it causes D to act against one of her strongly held sober desires: 
This is the same reasoning as 3, but instead of just any desire, suppose that D has a strongly held sober 
desire to not have sex with S. For example, suppose that D thinks that S is a scummy or otherwise bad 
person and would never, emphatically, have sex with S while sober. But, now, when drunk, D consents to 
 13 
have sex with S. Perhaps alcohol undermines D’s consent, because alcohol causes D to do something that 
she otherwise strongly desired not to do. 
Again, there are clear cases in which actions fit this description but are intuitively consensual. 
There are clear cases in which an individual acts against her firmly held convictions because of the 
influence of a chemical stimulus but in which her consent is valid. Consider these cases: 
Drunk Vegetarian: a vegetarian who strongly believes that eating meat is a moral travesty and 
who believes that consuming factory farmed meat is tantamount to murder is drunk in the gray 
area. She has not eaten all day and finds herself at a friend’s house where her friend is cooking 
hamburgers on the grill. The vegetarian, who is hungry at an extreme level and drunk, smells the 
meat cooking and suddenly decides to eat a hamburger. This action goes against the vegetarian’s 
strongly held desires.21   
It seems implausible to say that when she asked her friend, ‘can I have a burger?’ that he violated her 
consent by giving her a burger. Although this talk of consenting to take the burger may sound unintuitive, 
it is parallel to the case of sexual consent. The issue is whether the ‘yes’ of a drunk person, to a 
hamburger or to sex, is morally valid and if the offerer, whether offering sex or a hamburger, violates the 
drunk person’s consent by acting on her ‘yes.’ Thus, simply because something goes against our strongly 
held desires does not meant that we cannot consent to it. This intuition can be further pumped: 
Enticing Employment: S is morally averse to working in marketing, as she finds that it deceives 
people. But, while on the job hunt, she is offered an incredibly high salary to work at a marketing 
firm. Even though it violates her strongly held desire to not work in marketing, S agrees to work 
at the marketing firm. 
Impulsive Tattoo: S strongly desires to not have a tattoo. But, after going through a very rough 
breakup, S impulsively decides to go get a tattoo, full of sadness and remorse. 
Adult Mini-Van: S is a young parent who strongly desires to not own a mini-van. But, it 
eventually becomes clear to S and his wife that they must purchase a mini-van in order to 
accommodate the size of their growing family. So, they buy a mini-van. 
 
21 There is actually a real pattern behind this case. According to some (popular level) sources, many vegetarians do 
eat meat when they are drunk. A British website conducted a survey of 1,789 people in the UK who identified as 
vegetarians. The results were as follows: “over a third of respondents (37%) admitted that they did so. The 
remaining 63% of respondents were adamant they never ate meat when drunk. Respondents who disclosed they had 
eaten meat when drunk were asked to disclose how often they did so: 1. Every time you are drunk on a night ought-
34%. 2. Fairly often-26%. 3 Rarely-22%. Occasionally-18%” (Evison). 
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In each of these cases, an individual acts in conflict with her strongly held desires due to some kind of 
external influence. But, it seems clearly absurd to say that S did not give consent in these cases. So, even 
if D acts against her strongly held sober desire to not have sex with S, this does not undermine her 
consent. 
5: alcohol undermines consent, because it causes D to be subject to framing effects: 
Framing effects are ubiquitous in our lives. One might think that consent can be undermined by framing 
effects and that alcohol creates a kind of framing effect. A framing effect occurs when an individual 
“would express different preferences towards the same option, given the same information about that 
option, depending only on whether that information is expressed as a gain or a loss.”22 Framing effects 
can be both trivial and extremely serious. For example, “consumers who are more likely to use credit than 
cash when the price difference between them is described as a discount (gain) for using cash, but are more 
likely to use cash when that same difference is described as a surcharge (loss) for using credit, are 
vulnerable to a framing effect.”23 And, in a more dire case, “a patient who consents to a medical 
intervention when its prognosis is described as 90%chance of survival but who would dissent if it were 
instead described as 10% chance of mortality is subject to a framing effect.”24 
There is compelling empirical evidence that alcohol causes drunk people to be more susceptible 
to framing effects. If framing effects can invalidate consent, then this might be why alcohol invalidates 
consent.  
In the empirical literature on alcohol, there is a well-documented phenomenon called alcohol 
myopia. Briefly, alcohol myopia can be described as follows: 
Alcohol does not act as a general disinhibitor, as is commonly thought. Rather, alcohol leads 
people to attend to only the most salient cues in the environment, whether they are inhibiting or 
 
22 Chwang, 271. The idea of a framing effect was first introduced in Kahneman and Tversky’s classic 1979 paper. 
For further discussion of the effect of framing effects on consent, see Hanna (2011) and Cohen (2013). 
23 Chwang, 271. 
24 Chwang, 271. 
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disinhibiting (impelling). If impelling cues are present, the target behavior will be more likely, 
but if inhibiting cues are present, the behavior will be less likely. Past research has shown that 
either aggression (Zeichner & Pihl, 1979) or prosocial behavior (Steele, Critchlow, & Liu, 1985) 
can be increased or decreased by alcohol intoxication, depending on what types of cues are made 
salient.25 
The theory of alcohol myopia states that when intoxicated, a person is more likely to attend to 
only the most salient cues in the environment. That is, when faced with the conflict about whether 
to drink and drive, an intoxicated person is more likely to see only the pros or the cons, depending 
on which type of cue is most salient. If inhibiting cues are most salient, alcohol intoxication 
should decrease the likelihood that one will drink and drive. However, if impelling cues are most 
salient, alcohol intoxication should increase the likelihood that one will drink and drive.26 
In short, when an individual is experiencing alcohol myopia, she tends to see mainly the pros or mainly 
the cons of a proposed behavior, depending on whether she is exposed to a certain kind of impelling or 
disinhibiting cue. So, in the context of sex, this might involve a person who is aware of the other’s 
drunkenness framing a sexual offer in such a way that highlights the benefits. For example, S might say to 
D, “you should have sex with me, lots of girls I’ve slept with say I’m really good,” as opposed to S 
saying, “you should have sex with me, only some of the girls I’ve slept with had a bad time.” It may be 
the case that D would consent if S says the first statement and she would not consent upon hearing the 
second. Thus, alcohol may cause a framing effect, which may invalidate D’s consent to sex with C. 
Here, I will clarify in more detail what this line of reasoning is saying and then will argue that 
there is compelling reason to think that it fails. 
First, it is important to clarify under what conditions framing effects would invalidate consent. 
There are two possibilities: either S knows that he is causing D to be subject to a framing effect, or he 
does not know this. If S does not know that his offer puts D into a framing situation, it seems clear that he 
is not acting in a blameworthy way. If, by accident, he says something that frames his sexual offer in such 
a way that induces D to say, ‘yes,’ there is nothing nefarious about his behavior. We would have no 
reason to say that he has acted wrongly, at least not on the grounds of framing effects. But, if S knew 
 
25 MacDonald et al., 974. 
26 MacDonald et al., 974 
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about alcohol myopia and then tried to manipulate D with this knowledge, this seems to threaten D’s 
consent.27 
I now argue that, even if D is subject to framing effects when drunk, her consent is still valid. 
First, there is compelling reason to think that, in general, framing effects do not undermine consent. What 
background condition of consent are framing effects supposed to negate? They don’t involve coercion 
(they are just words),28 they don’t prohibit the rationality of the agent (you can think about it for as long 
as you want), and they don’t deceive the agent (they are just logically equivalent ways of saying the same 
thing). So, prima facie, they don’t undermine consent. The burden of proof should be on the objector to 
show that framing effects do undermine consent. 
Also, if we say that framing effects undermine consent, we can’t just say it in the sexual case. So, 
if there are cases of framed consent that are valid, then this gives us reason to doubt that it undermines 
consent in the sexual case. Consider the following cases of sober framing effects from Chwang: 
My consent to the purchase of a bicycle can remain valid even if (a) the vendor reports that 90% 
of its riders are satisfied and (b) I would not have consented had the vendor instead reported that 
10% of its riders are dissatisfied. As a second example, it is perfectly permissible, though perhaps 
underhanded, for an advertisement to report ‘four out of five dentists agree’ rather than ‘one out 
of five dentists disagree’. And, to return to an earlier example, my consent to use credit instead of 
cash can remain valid even if I think of my decision as forgoing a discount rather than as 
incurring a surcharge. In other words, in a wide range of ordinary cases the moral requirements 
for valid consent are quite lax: valid consent can be uninformed, and it can be subject to framing 
effects.29 
Second, there is compelling reason to believe that, in a sober sexual encounter, framing effects don’t 
undermine consent. Imagine a framing effect in a sober sexual encounter: A tells B, “in research that I’ve 
anecdotally conducted, 90% of women I sleep with are happy that they did so,” vs. “in research I’ve 
 
27 Of course, if framing effects do undermine consent, this kind of sexual interaction would be blameless but would 
not involve valid consent.  
28 One might object that words can be coercive. While I have serious doubts about this view, it seems clear that the 
words involved in framing effects not coercive. If words could be coercive, the coercion would lie in what the 
speaker is threatening to do. In a framing effect, there is no even apparent threat. For a general discussion of whether 
words can be coercive, see Conly (2004). 
29 Chwang 274. 
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conducted, 10% of women I sleep with report being dissatisfied with me.” It doesn’t seem like this would 
invalidate A having sex with B, even if she would not have had the other version been said. If this consent 
is valid, then framing effects cannot be the reason that drunken consent is invalid. 
Third, even if framing effects undermine D’s consent to sex, this is not very relevant. In the end, I 
suspect that framing effects rarely happen in sexual cases. If framing effects are the reason alcohol 
undermines consent, this will show that alcohol rarely undermines consent. After all, it is rarely true that 
the people in sexual interactions involving alcohol are trying to manipulate each other via framing effects. 
Also, people who want to engage in drunken sex could just avoid the use of framing effects and would 
thereby not be doing anything wrong. And, this wouldn’t cover cases in which D is the one who asks for 
sex from S. 
6: alcohol undermines consent, because at some later time, D regrets having intoxicated sex with S: 
Here, the line of reasoning is that, because D does something while under the influence of alcohol that she 
later regrets, this makes her consent in the moment invalid.  
This fails for the simple reason that it’s obvious that regret, on its own, does not invalidate 
consent. For example, if a sober person were to buy a house and then regret buying it a week later, this is 
not grounds for her to claim that the realtor violated her consent. 
7: alcohol undermines consent, because it causes D to be over-confident in her abilities: 
One might think that alcohol undermines consent, because it causes a false sense of invincibility in the 
intoxicated person, which makes her think that she’s not as drunk as she is. However, the empirical 
literature suggests that this is false: 
We tested the notion of drunken invincibility, which suggests that intoxicated participants may 
overestimate their own driving ability, thereby assuming that the dangers normally related to 
drinking and driving would not affect them. We did not find any evidence for this phenomenon—
participants who had been drinking were aware that they would not drive as well as the average 
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person, whereas participants who were sober estimated that they would drive better than the 
average person.30 
8: alcohol undermines consent, because it causes us to change our beliefs about morality or to be worse 
at moral reasoning: 
One might claim that it is not just that alcohol causes people to act against their sober moral beliefs; 
rather, alcohol perhaps causes people to change their moral beliefs temporarily. Perhaps this undermines 
intoxicated consent. 
Again, this is too strong. Consider this case: 
Intro Student: a bright undergraduate takes an intro to ethics course in her freshman year. She 
reads Singer’s arguments for the moral necessity of donating money to the poor. In a moment of 
being emotionally convinced by Singer, she donates a sizable amount of money to Oxfam. But, a 
few minutes later, she comes up with what seems to her to be a compelling objection to Singer’s 
moral principle, and she changes her mind to think that her donation was not obligatory.  
It seems clear to me that this student’s consent was not violated by Oxfam; thus, a temporary change in 
moral beliefs does not undermine consent. 
9. alcohol undermines consent, because manipulation is involved: 
Manipulation is not essential to drunken sex, but it may often occur in the midst of drunken sex, and 
drunkenness may make D more susceptible to being manipulated. Perhaps drunken sex is not consensual 
when manipulation is involved.  
This line of reasoning fails for several reasons. First, being made more susceptible to 
manipulation is not unique to alcohol. Many other things make us more susceptible to being manipulated 
but do not undermine consent. For example, being in love with someone may make us more easily 
manipulated, but this does not seem to undermine consent. Second, manipulation in general does not 
undermine consent. When I discuss manipulation, I have in mind the phenomenon that occurs when A 
 
30 MacDonald et al, 1995, 982 
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does not deceive or coerce B but packages information in such a way that is more likely to procure B’s 
consent but which B would otherwise not take as a reason to consent. Manipulation is a frequent 
occurrence in business transactions that are clearly consensual. And, for the same reasons that framing 
effects don’t undermine consent (they are not coercive, not deceptive, and do not make the recipient less 
rational) manipulation also does not undermine consent. 
I take it that I have considered an exhaustive list of reasons why one might believe that 
intoxication in the gray area undermines D’s consent. I conclude that there are no good reasons to think 
that D is unable to give valid consent to have sex. 
V. Reasons That S Should Not Act on D’s Consent, Even If It’s Valid: 
The previous section concluded that the best reasons for thinking that D cannot give valid consent fail. 
But, what about S’s situation? It might be the case that D can consent, while S is never justified in acting 
on this token of consent. I consider several reasons why this could be the case. 
1. S cannot act on D’s consent, because it is too morally risky: 
Perhaps D can validly consent, but S will never have sufficient justification for knowing that D has 
consented. If S were to have sex with D without having a justified belief that D had consented, this would 
be seriously morally wrong. Recently, Dixon has argued that considerations of moral caution bid S to not 
have sex with D. His argument runs as follows: 
P1: it is permissible for S to have sex with D, only if S is justified in believing that D’s consent is 
valid. 
P2: if D is at the intermediate intoxication level, then S cannot be justified in believing that D’s 
consent is valid. 
C: thus, it is impermissible for S to have sex with D.31 
 
One might wonder why S needs positive justification that D’s consent is valid instead of only needing the 
absence of evidence that D’s consent is invalid (i.e. the absence of defeaters for the belief that D’s consent 
 
31 Although this argument is from Dixon, I borrow the decision theoretic formulation from David Boonin. 
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is valid). While there are certainly domains in which belief is innocent until proven guilty, consent is not 
such a domain. To permissibly have sex with someone else, we must have undefeated justification that 
they have given valid consent.  
One way to understand P1 is in terms of a decision theory matrix with the following options: 
 S has sex with D S does not have sex 
with D 
D’s consent was 
valid 
D’s desire for sex is 
fulfilled, and D’s 
rights are not 
violated. 
D’s rights are not 
violated, but D’s 
desire for sex is 
frustrated. 
D’s consent was 
invalid 
D’s rights are 
violated. 
D’s rights are not 
violated, but D’s 
desire for sex is 
frustrated. 
Essentially, S is uncertain about whether D is in the gray area; for this reason, there is a non-zero 
probability that him acting on her ‘yes’ would amount to violating her rights. And, because a rights 
violation is always worse than D’s desire for sex being frustrated, it seems like even a modest amount of 
moral caution would bid S to not have sex with D.32 
While I’m sympathetic to Dixon’s proposal, I think it proves too much. Depending on what is 
required for S to have justified belief that his sexual partner has consented, it may turn out that no sex is 
ever permissible. In any sexual interaction, there is always a non-zero probability that one partner’s 
consent is not valid. So, if just this is sufficient to render the sex impermissible (because one party lacks 
justification that the other’s consent is valid), then all sex is impermissible. This proves too much. But, if 
we relax the standard of what it means to be justified in believing that one’s partner has given valid 
consent, then it may turn out that drunken sex passes the test. After all, S is aware of the argument from 
the  previous section, he should be no more cautious about having sex with D when she is extremely 
happy or sad than he is when she is drunk. So, on a more relaxed standard of being reasonably sure, 
 
32 Something like this argument is mirrored in the University of Michigan’s consent policy: “The use of alcohol or 
other drugs may impair either party’s ability to determine whether consent has been sought or given. If one has 
doubt about either party’s level of intoxication, the safe thing to do is to forego all sexual activity.” The Utah State 
University has a very similar policy  as well. 
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which would likely include the possibility of consensual happy or sad sex, S can be reasonably sure that 
D has given valid consent. 
Given this, I conclude that there is no sufficient reason concerning moral caution to bid S to not 
act on D’s ‘yes’ to have sex with him. 
2. S cannot act on D’s consent, because drunken sex is so wrong that it overrides consent: 
One might object that S should not act on D’s consent, because although their sex would be consensual, it 
would be so wrong for non-consent based reasons that it would be all-things-considered impermissible. 
Recall that consent is only a some-things-considered moral transformative, meaning that consensual acts 
can be all-things-considered impermissible. Perhaps drunken sex fits into this category. 
What might be the relevant wrong involved that would make otherwise consensual sex so wrong 
that it’s impermissible? Some candidates that will fail immediately are worth getting out of the way to 
start. Drunken sex cannot be rendered all-things-considered impermissible by the fact that D will 
experience regret or negative emotions later. It’s certainly not good for D to feel those things, but in 
general, negative ex-post emotions do not undermine previously consensual decisions and make them so 
wrong that they are impermissible. For example, suppose that someone buys a new car on an impulse, 
regrets it, attempts to return it, but then remembers that the dealership has a strict no returns policy. This 
person will surely feel immense regret, but this regret is not sufficient to render the salesman’s behavior 
impermissible.  
It is also important to note that negative emotions and regret are not essential to drunken sex. 
There are presumably many drunken sexual encounters that are remembered fondly by their participants.  
Perhaps the issue is not just that D will experience regret or negative emotions; instead the objection 
could be that S has good reason to know that these negative emotions will occur. Suppose that S knew 
before having sex that it would be consensual but that D would regret it the next day and would 
 22 
experience intense emotional distress about her decision. Would this be sufficient reason for S’s action to 
be impermissible? 
No, I do not think this would make S’s action impermissible. Although it is certainly not virtuous 
to knowingly engage in behaviors that one knows will cause emotional distress to others, this is not so 
strong of a reason as to prohibit those actions. For example, the owners of fast food restaurants surely 
know that drunk customers who consent to buy their products in the moment will experience regret the 
next morning at their unhealthy decision. And, for any given human romantic relationship, there is a very 
strong chance that it will end with a breakup and the sadness that accompanies it. By this line of 
reasoning, entering into a relationship would be wrong, because the partners would know that there is a 
substantial chance that it would result in severe emotional distress to the other person. 
Here, the objector might try to make the example much more high stakes. Consider the following case: 
Affair Regret: suppose that A is good friends with B. B is having marital stress and comes to A 
for consolation. After becoming drunk, B initiates sex with A. A knows that B will experience 
immense regret the next day if they have sex. 
It seems that even if A can validly consent to sex with B, B ought to not have sex with A. While I agree 
with this intuition, I think that alcohol is not doing any of the work. Suppose we revised Affair Regret so 
that B is not drunk at all but is instead heavily influenced by extreme emotions. It seems equally clear to 
me in that case that B should not have sex with A. Given this, it appears that alcohol is not doing the work 
in explaining why sex is wrong in Affair Regret; instead, A’s special relationship with B explains why 
their sex is wrong. Thus, this case does not show that drunken sex is so wrong that it’s impermissible. 
Lastly, and I think most plausibly, drunken sex might be so wrong to be impermissible, because it 
involves a failure of virtue on S’s part. Suppose that A goes to bars with the explicit purpose of finding 
drunk women and seducing them. There is something very scummy and vicious about this behavior. 
Would this kind of sexual vice be sufficient to make consensual sex so bad that it’s impermissible? I think 
the answer is no. Again, it seems that alcohol is not doing the work in this case. Suppose that instead of 
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seeking out drunk women, A seeks out sad women who are alone on Valentine’s Day or sad women who 
have just ended a relationship? This seems equally vicious as the previous case, but I do not feel the pull 
of this behavior being so bad that it renders otherwise consensual sex impermissible.33 Furthermore, it’s 
important to note that this kind of sexual vice does not characterize most of the drunken sex that likely 
occurs in the world. I suspect, although I cannot confirm, that most drunk sex occurs in a spur of the 
moment situation without much antecedent planning. So, readers who are swayed by the concern that vice 
undermines otherwise permissible sex can still adopt my view while excluding the cases of drunken sex 
that do not involve such vicious motivations, of which I’m sure there are many, perhaps even the 
majority. 
3. S cannot act on D’s consent, because S is responsible for D’s drunken decisions: 
One might think that even if D can give valid consent to S, S should not have sex with D because S bears 
a strict responsibility for any decisions that D makes. So described, this sounds strange. It will help to 
introduce the example that motivates this argument. In the 1990s, in the case of Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj 
Mahal Associates, the plaintiff (Hakimoglu) sued the Taj Mahal casino for allowing him to gamble after 
he had become too drunk to be responsible for his actions. Hakimoglu’s lawyers argued that the Taj 
Mahal violated the dram shop liability law, according to which bartenders who overserve a patron bear a 
strict liability for any damages caused by this patron.34 Hakimoglu argued that the casino allowed him to 
incur damages by overserving him in just the way that a bartender might wrongfully overserve a patron 
 
33 The normative power of consent is such that it will often override the wrongness of vice, even if this viciousness 
is a wrong-making feature of the situation. Additionally, I’m inclined to say that a behavior can be permissible 
although vicious because there are clear cases of this phenomenon. For example, perhaps A and B are going to get 
into a fistfight. Let’s stipulate that A has a good reason to fight B, i.e. it’s for a noble cause. In this situation, it 
seems completely permissible for A to choose to run away instead of fighting. But, perhaps running away from a 
fight that defends a good cause is vicious, in particular cowardly. 
34 Ryan describes dram shop law in the following way: “Dram shop statutes impose a duty upon tavern owners to 
patrons and third persons sustaining injuries resulting from the tavern's negligent service of alcohol to visibly 
intoxicated customers” ( 1258). 
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who later gets into a car accident.35 Although the court ultimately ruled against Hakimoglu, the general 
principle he advanced is plausible.  
How is this a reason that D cannot act on S’s token of consent? Suppose that Hakimoglu’s 
drunkenness was in the gray area, and due to the effect of alcohol, he did something that he regretted 
deeply and gambled away a lot of money. Does this entitle him to recoup the lost money? Similarly, if D 
is drunk in the gray area and has sex with S but deeply regrets it the next day, is it the case that S did 
something impermissible? Why might one think that the casino or S have done something impermissible 
to Hakimoglu or D respectively? I see two possible explanations for why something impermissible may 
have occurred: (1) S harmed D, or (2) S is responsible for any harms that occur to D. 
First, suppose that S harms D in having sex with her. Physical harm would violate the stipulations 
of this paper (as violence would be coercive). But, perhaps a lot of emotional harm is caused to D as a 
result of having drunken sex. So long as D can still consent, it seems implausible to me that negative 
emotions or regret after the fact could be so severe as to render S’s actions impermissible, as I argued in 
the previous point.  
Second, it could be the case that S is responsible in a special way for any emotional harms that 
occur to D. Although emotional harms to D may not be sufficient to make sex between S and D 
impermissible, it could also be the case that due to D being drunk, S acquires additional responsibility 
over the harms that befall D. If S knowingly allowed D to get drunk or is planning on having sex with 
someone who he knows is drunk, it could be the case that he has a special responsibility for emotional 
harms that befall D. Similar to how the bartender has a special responsibly for any harms that befall the 
overserved patron, S may have a special responsibility for any harms that befall D. Essentially, a 
 
35  Ryan summarizes this reasoning as follow: “dram shop liability seems to be applicable to casinos. When a tavern 
serves alcohol to a visibly intoxicated patron and allows him or her to drive home, causing physical injury in an 
automobile accident, the tavern may be liable for these injuries. Similarly, when a casino serves alcohol to a visibly 
intoxicated gambling patron and allows him or her to continue gambling, the patron suffers economic injury. The 
policy behind dram shop liability is the protection of innocent victims and intoxicated patrons from injury or 
property damage caused by the alcohol server's negligence” (1270). 
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bartender is not responsible for the harms that befall a person who gets drunk at their own house and then 
gets in a car accident, but a bartender is responsible for a person who gets very drunk at their bar and gets 
in a car accident. The reason for this is that the bartender has a special responsibility for the conduct of 
people that she serves alcohol to.  
Suppose that this is true; this objection still does not succeed. First, even if this were sufficient to 
make a consensual behavior impermissible, it is not always the case that drunken sex results in emotional 
harm. Second, even if S is responsible in some kind of loco parentis fashion for harms that may befall D, 
this still does not seem strong enough to make their sex impermissible.  
4. S cannot act on D’s consent, because third parties would be justified in preventing D from having sex 
with S: 
Consider the following case: 
Friend Intervention: A and D are good friends and have gone to a bar together. At the bar, they 
meet S, who flirts with D. A knows that D is drunk. D tells A that she is going to leave with S to 
have sex. A decides to intervene with mild physical restraint and verbal persuasion to prevent D 
from going home with S. D wants to have sex with S but does not fight very hard against A’s 
physical force, and she decides to go home. The next day, D is grateful that she did not have sex 
with S and thanks A for intervening. 
I think that A’s intervention was justified, but this does not mean that sex between D and S would not 
have been consensual. It does not follow from the fact that A was justified in using paternalistic influence 
on D that D could not have consented to have sex with S. It is perfectly coherent to say that D could 
consent but that she could still be thankful that A intervened to prevent her from making a decision that 
she would regret. Furthermore, it seems that our judgments in this case are biased by the fact that Friend 
Intervention involves a special obligation, namely friendship. If we were to revise the case so that A is a 
stranger who observes the situation and intervenes to stop it, I do not think we’d have the intuition that 
A’s intervention is justified. In fact, we would think that a stranger is not justified in using any kind of 
physical force to prevent another person from making a consensual decision. 
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5. S cannot act on D’s consent, because it is analogous to statutory rape: 
One might object in this way: suppose that D is 25-years-old and suppose that being in the gray area of 
intoxication were to lower her cognitive abilities to that of a 15-year-old. If S is allowed to have sex with 
D while she is drunk, would this entail that statutory rape is permissible? Since statutory rape is not 
permissible, this would be a serious problem for my view.36 
I do not think that my view has this implication for several reasons. First, I think it is incredibly 
unlikely that the cognitive impairment associated with gray area intoxication is sufficient to set a 25-year-
old’s cognitive abilities back to age 15. This would certainly have to be argued for. Second, suppose that 
we were to stipulate that this unlikely conclusion is correct and that a drunk 25-year-old is on a cognitive 
par with a 15-year-old. There would still be compelling reasons to prohibit statutory rape while allowing 
drunken sex for people 18 and over. The likely harms to a minor from having sex with an adult are so 
high that even if the minor can give valid consent, the sex would be harmful enough to justify a 
prohibition against it. For adults, these harms are not as likely to occur. For example, there is compelling 
evidence that so-called willing adult-child sex (i.e. when the child is not violently coerced into the sexual 
encounter) still severely harms the child; children who have had the experience of willing sex with an 
adult are likely to encounter the following harms: compared with children who aren’t victims of ACS 
(adult-child sex), victims of ACS are significantly more likely to suffer from major depression, with one 
study suggesting that female victims of ACS are twice as likely to suffer from depression as non-
victims.37 Compared with non-victims, victims of ACS have been found to be twice, and in one study, 
three times more likely to have attempted suicide.38 In contrast with non-victims, victims of ACS have 
less education and lower income,39 are nearly three times more likely to be in an abusive relationship as 
 
36 I am thankful to an anonymous referee for raising this point. 
37 Beitchman (et al.), 1992, 106 and Rohde, 2007, 878. 
38 Dube, 2005, 430 and Beitchman (et al.), 1992, 107. 
39 Currie, 2010, 111. 
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an adult,40 and are more likely to develop personality disorders.41 The list could go on. The likely harms of 
adult-child sex are immense, so much so that they make adult-child sex clearly wrong, even if it is 
consensual. It seems undeniable that an action with these likely harms is impermissible, even if it is 
consensual. And, again, I still think that it is highly unlikely that intoxication impairs adults to the point 
where they are on a cognitive par with children. Third, I feel the intuitive force of the idea that age qua 
age is a morally relevant trait. So, if this intuition is reliable, then the bare fact that the 15-year-old is 15 
and that the 25-year-old is 25 would explain why sex  is permissible for the latter but not for the former, 
even if their cognitive abilities are on a par. 
VI. Can the Stipulations Be Relaxed? 
The argument in this paper was based on a number of stipulations about drunken sex. Although I do not 
think these stipulations are unreasonable, they might exclude a number of relevant cases of drunken sex 
that may commonly occur in reality. In this section, I discuss which of my stipulations can be relaxed and 
have my argument still succeed. 
Stipulations one, three, four, and seven through ten clearly do not exclude any relevant cases.  
The second stipulation (that S and D have no history of sexual relationship and are either 
acquaintances or strangers) does not exclude any relevant cases. After all, if sex between S and D is 
justified when they have no sexual history and barely know each other, presumably the standard would 
get lower when these assumptions are relaxed. In general, people who have a history of sexual 
relationship or who know each other well are better at interpreting each other’s sexual cues, body 
language, and preferences. Essentially, it seems that the epistemic bar for knowing that another person has 
consented is higher when this person is a stranger. Thus, this stipulation does not bar my account from 
reaching any difficult or relevant cases.  
 
40 Beitchman, 1992, 108. 
41 Beitchman, 1992, 109. 
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Stipulation five (that S is sober or intoxicated below the gray area) excludes the common case in 
which both parties are drunk in the gray area. I made this stipulation as an initial way of making the topic 
more precise, but this stipulation is not essential to my argument succeeding. If one drunk person can give 
valid consent to a sober person, then it seems to follow that two drunk people can give valid consent to 
each other. It would be strange if two people who can give valid consent could not give valid consent to 
each other.  
Stipulation six (that D’s drunkenness is the result of her own voluntary behavior) may exclude 
some relevant cases. One might think that this stipulation excludes the common case in which S buys 
alcohol for D, and D drinks it. However, so long as D is still able to make voluntary decisions, consuming 
alcohol that D has given her would be voluntary, even though it was given to her by another person. So 
long as she can still make voluntary decisions, D can choose to not drink the alcohol that S gives her. If 
she chooses to drink it, then the decision is voluntary. This would be true even in a case where S is 
supplying D with alcohol for the explicit purpose of getting her drunk to make sex more likely. So long as 
D is voluntarily consuming the alcohol, the source and the source’s intentions should be irrelevant for 
assessing if D’s drunkenness is voluntary. One might also think that this stipulation excludes the common 
case in which S puts more alcohol than D asked for or is conventional in her drink. This case, I believe, 
falls outside the scope of my analysis, because although D’s consumption would be voluntary, S has 
deceived her.  
VII. Implications for Policy: 
I’ve argued that competent adults who are drunk can give morally valid consent to have sex with each 
other. As I’ve noted, many universities have begun to make this behavior liable to punishment and 
expulsion. When these policies are enforced by public institutions, I believe that they are unjust. Public 
institutions should not enforce rules that criminalize legal and otherwise permissible behaviors. When 
these rules are enforced by private institutions, they are not necessarily unjust, but they needlessly 
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penalize consensual behavior. These policies are not unjust at private institutions, because private 
institutions are within their rights to regulate the conduct of their employees and patrons, so long as these 
individuals knew these rules going in. However, these policies still seem highly misguided. They 
needlessly punish consensual behaviors in the name of protecting consent. For that reason, these policies 
fail to live up their own goal. Of course, if universities have some reason other than consent to ban 
drunken sex (perhaps a religious prohibition), that is makes sense.42 But, banning drunken sex on the 
grounds that it is not consensual is wrongheaded. Such a policy leads to a situation in which individuals 
who have engaged in consensual sex are expelled from school, have their studies interrupted, and are 
marked as sexual offenders. 
One might object that, even if S and D can validly consent to have sex, it is a best practice for 
universities to ban drunken sex. Drunken sex is surely more likely than sober sex to lead to assault or 
rape. Perhaps, on this basis, universities would be justified in banning it to prevent the chance that it 
would lead to assault or rape. I think this is misguided. It seems very unlikely that simply banning 
drunken sex would prevent students from getting drunk and having sex. Beyond this, it is in general 
wrong to ban a consensual behavior on the grounds that allowing this behavior would lead to an increase 
in bad actions. If this principle were applied broadly, alcohol would be banned altogether, as it makes 
vehicular homicide more likely. This principle is too strong and should be rejected.  
Lastly, as I’ve noted before, the account developed in this paper is neutral with regard to the 
debate on affirmative consent on college campuses.  
Conclusion: 
 
42 Public universities are bound to neutrality about the good. Institutions funded by the public should not take a 
stance on what the good life is or try to legislate virtue. Thus, these universities should not ban drunken sex. And, 
even if they advertise their rules that ban it in advance and the students are aware of it, these rules would be wrong 
on the grounds of violating neutrality. Perhaps those rules in the status quo are consensually agreed to, but they are 
wrong on other grounds. Private organizations have no obligations of neutrality about the good. So, they have the 
right to prohibit a permissible behavior on their property, so long as doing so advances their institutional mission. I 
see this as part of their right to freedom of association. 
 30 
There is no good reason to think that D cannot give valid consent, and there is no good reason to think 
that S cannot act on D’s consent. Thus, drunken sex is permissible. 
The field of sexual ethics is experiencing a renaissance, which has no doubt been caused in part 
by the increased cultural awareness of how bad our sexual practices have historically been. As we expand 
our theoretical understanding of the ethics of sex, we need to be willing to follow the argument where it 
leads. Many universities have made their decisions before seeing where the argument leads. This is, I 
believe, deeply misguided. At the end of the day, the field of sexual ethics should shy away from the view 






Beitchman, Joseph H et al. “A Review of the Long-Term Effects of Child Sexual Abuse.” Child 
Abuse & Neglect 16 (1992): 101-118. 
 
Beloit College. “Sexual Assault and Misconduct Policies.” (Accessed 2019). 
https://www.beloit.edu/sexual-assault/policy/ 
Cohen, Shlomo. “Nudging and Informed Consent.” The American Journal of Bioethics 13, no. 6 (2013): 
3-11. 
Cole, Kevin. “Sex and the Single Malt Girl: How Voluntary Intoxication Affects Consent.” Montana Law 
Review 155 (2017): 155-185. 
Conly, Sarah. “Seduction Rape, and Coercion.” Ethics 115, no. 1 (2004): 96-121. 
Cowan, Sharon. “The Trouble with Drink: Intoxication, (In)Capacity, and the Evaporation of Consent to 
Sex.” Akron Law Review 41 (2008): 899-922. 
Currie, Janet and Cathy Spatz Widom. “Long-Term Consequences of Child Abuse and Neglect 
on Adult Economic Well-Being.” Child Maltreatment 15, no. 2 (2010): 111-120. 
 
Dube, Shanta R. et al. “Long-Term Consequences of Childhood Sexual Abuse by Gender of 
Victim.” American Journal of Preventive Medicine 28, no. 5 (2005): 430-438Dimock, 
Susan. “The Responsibility of Intoxicated Offenders.” Journal of Value Inquiry 43, no. 3 (2009): 
339-368. 
- - -“What Are Intoxicated Offenders Responsible For? The ‘Intoxication Defense’ re-Examined.” 
Criminal Law and Philosophy 5, no. 1 (2011): 1-20. 
Dixon, Nicholas. “Alcohol and Rape.” Public Affairs Quarterly 15, no. 4 (2001): 341-354. 
Dougherty, Tom. “Affirmative consent and due diligence.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 46 (2018): 90-
112. 
Evison, James. “A Third of Vegetarians Eat Meat When Drunk.” The MA. 
https://www.morningadvertiser.co.uk/Article/2015/10/07/A-third-of-vegetarians-eat-meat-when-
drunk. October 2015. 
 32 
Hanna, Jason. “Consent and the Problem of Framing Effects.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 
(2011): 517-531. 
Hess, Amanda. “How Drunk Is Too Drunk To Have Sex?” Slate (2015). https://slate.com/human-
interest/2015/02/drunk-sex-on-campus-universities-are-struggling-to-determine-when-
intoxicated-sex-becomes-sexual-assault.html 
Hurd, Heidi. “The Moral Magic of Consent.” Legal Theory 2 (1996): 121-146. 
Husak, Doug. “Intoxication and Culpability.” Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (2012): 363-379. 
Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk.” 
Econometrica 47, no. 2 (1979): 263-292. 
Krentzman, Jessica L. “Dram Shop Law - Gambling While Intoxicated: The Winner Takes It All - The 
Third Circuit Examines a Casino's Liability for Allowing a Patron to Gamble While Intoxicated.” 
Villanova Law Review 41 (1996): 1255-1284. 
Lerner, Jennifer S, et al. “Emotion and Decision Making.” Annual Review of Psychology 66 (2015): 799-
823. 
Loewenstein, G., & Lerner, J. S. “The Role of Affect in Decision Making.” In R. Davidson, H. 
Goldsmith, & K. Scherer (Ed.), Handbook of Affective Science (pp. 619-642), 2003. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press.  
MacDonald, Tara K, et al. “Decision Making in Altered States: Effects of Alcohol on Attitudes Toward 
Drinking and Driving.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 68, no. 6 (1995): 973-985. 
MacGregor, Joan. “Force, Consent, and the Reasonable Woman," in Jules Coleman and Allen Buchanan 
(eds.) In Harm's Way: Essays in Honor of Joel Feinberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), pp. 231-254. 
Ohio University. “Consent.” (Accessed 2019). https://www.ohio.edu/survivor/information/consent.cfm 
Pineau, Lois. “Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis.” Law and Philosophy 8, no. 2 (1989): 217-243. 
Rohde, Paul et al. “Associations of child sexual and physical abuse with obesity and depression 
in middle-aged women.” Child Abuse & Neglect 32 (2008): 878-887. 
 33 
Roosa Mark W., et al. “Measurement of Women's Child Sexual Abuse Experiences: An 
Empirical Demonstration of the Impact of Choice of Measure on Estimates of Incidence 
Rates and of Relationships with Pathology.” The Journal of Sex Research 35, no. 3 
(1998): 225-233. 
 
Ryan, Valerie M. “Intoxicating Encounters: Allocating Responsibility in the Law of Rape.” California 
Western Law Review 40, no. 2 (2004): 407-429. 
University of Michigan. “University of Michigan Policy & Procedures on Student Sexual & Gender-
Based Misconduct & Other Forms of Interpersonal Violence.” (Accessed 2019). 
https://studentsexualmisconductpolicy.umich.edu/content/2-incapacitation 
University of Tulsa. “Sexual Violence Prevention & Education.” (Accessed 2019). 
https://utulsa.edu/sexual-violence-prevention-education/alcohol-consent/ 
Wertheimer, Alan. “Intoxicated Consent to Sexual Relations.” Law and Philosophy 20, no. 4 (2001): 373-
401. 
- - - Consent to Sexual Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2003. 
 
